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Summary
 On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore
full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya’s listing as a state sponsor
of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Presidential Determination No. 2006-14 certified that the government of Libya had
not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six months
and had provided assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism
in the future. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31 when the United
States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy. A 45-day congressional
notification period ended on June 29, and the Secretary of State removed Libya’s
listings and ended the associated trade restrictions on June 30, without immediate
public announcement.  The Administration has not named an ambassador nominee.
The changes mark the culmination of an initial period of improvement and
rapprochement in U.S.-Libyan relations that began in December 2003, when the
Libyan government announced its decision to eliminate its weapons of mass
destruction and long-range missile programs. Observers expect that these changes
will usher in a new era in the U.S.-Libyan relationship, which has been strained and
hostile for much of the last 35 years.  Administration officials have stated that
normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations will provide opportunities for the United
States to address specific issues of potential concern to Congress such as political and
economic reform, the development of energy resources, and human rights.
 
Since the May 15 announcement, some Members of Congress and family
members of U.S. citizens killed and injured in Libyan-sponsored or supported
terrorist attacks have expressed their opposition to the recent changes in U.S. policy.
Legal representatives for the Libyan government and some victims’ families have
resumed talks regarding financial claims arising from the bombings of Pan Am Flight
103, the LaBelle nightclub in Berlin, and other incidents.  A Libyan legal team has
asserted that it considers the Libyan government’s obligations under its original
agreement with families of the Pan Am 103 victims to have been fulfilled, but has
pledged to “deal with these cases most transparently and in complete good faith.”
In the 109th Congress, Section 625 of the House version of the FY2007 Science,
State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations (H.R. 5672) would
have prohibited the use of funds “to carry out any diplomatic operations in Libya” or
accept the credentials of any Libya government representative until the President
certifies that Libya “has taken irrevocable steps to pay, in its entirety, the total
amount of the settlement commitment of $10,000,000” to the Pan Am Flight 103
families and that Libya “will continue to work in good faith” to resolve other cases
“including the settlement of the La Belle Discotheque bombing.” S.Res. 504 (passed
June 7, 2006) and H.Res. 838 also called for the resolution of all outstanding cases.
This report provides background information on Libya and U.S.-Libyan
relations; profiles Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi; discusses Libya’s political
and economic reform efforts; and reviews current issues of potential congressional
interest.  It will be updated periodically to reflect important developments.  
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Recent Developments
On January 11, 2007, President Bush signed the Department of State Authorities
Act of 2006 (H.R. 6060, P.L. 109-472), which removed a prohibition that had
prevented persons doing business with Libya from receiving diplomatic construction
contracts.  According to the committee report on the act (H.Rept. 109-706), the
Administration sought “relief from this prohibition in order to undertake near-term
activities, such as refurbishing and maintaining the current Embassy location in
Tripoli, as well as beginning the preparations to build a new embassy compound.”
In December 2006, Libya’s criminal court upheld the conviction and death
sentence of five Bulgarian female nurses and one Palestinian male doctor on charges
that they deliberately infected 426 Libyan children with HIV.  President Bush and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have pledged to Bulgarian authorities that the
United States will continue to work for the nurses’ release.  Libyan officials warned
of further politicization of the case after the European Parliament and Council of the
European Union both formally expressed concern about the Libyan court’s verdict.
The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission continued its examination of
the sentence, trial, and conviction of former Libyan intelligence agent Abd al Baset
Ali al Megrahi, who was convicted of participating in the bombing of Pan Am flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988.  In November 2006, the
commission ruled that Al Megrahi’s appeals could be heard in Scottish courts.
Following a 45-day congressional notification period that ended on June 29, the
Secretary of State rescinded Libya’s listings as a state sponsor of terrorism and a
country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts on June 30, 2006.
The rescission removed the final series of terrorism-related trade restrictions and the
remaining legal obstacles to normal bilateral relations.  The Bush Administration had
previously announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and
to rescind Libya’s listings, and did so on May 31 by upgrading the U.S. Liaison
Office in Tripoli to Embassy status. An ambassador nominee has not been named.
Libyan officials have welcomed the changes in U.S. policy, although some
Members of Congress and family members of U.S. victims killed or injured in
Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks have criticized the decision out of concern for
outstanding settlement claims being brought by the victims’ families.  These attacks
include the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and the Labelle nightclub in
Berlin in 1986.  On June 25, the head of a legal team representing the Libyan
government asserted that the team considers Libya’s obligations under its original
agreement with families of the Pan Am Flight 103 victims to have been fulfilled, but
pledged to “deal with these cases most transparently and in complete good faith.”
CRS-2
1 The Arabic word jamahirriya means “state of the masses” or “peoples’ authority” and was
added to Libya’s official name in 1978 by Col. Muammar Qadhafi to reflect Libya’s
nominally decentralized political system.  The adjective ‘great’ was added in 1986.
2 Multiple spellings of Muammar Al Qadhafi’s first and last names are used in the Western
press.  This report uses a phonetic spelling; others reflect varying pronunciations.
Background and Recent History
The north African territory that now composes the Great Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahirriya1 has a long cultural history as a center of Phoenician,
Carthaginian, Roman, Berber, and Arab civilizations. Modern Libya’s distinct
regions and tribally-influenced society create a complex political environment that
is made up of  diverse constituencies from northwestern Tripolitania, northeastern
Cyrenaica, and the more remote southwestern Fezzan (see Figure 1). Significant
economic and political changes have occurred since Libya became independent in
1951.  These changes have been fueled by the country’s emergence from Italian
colonization, the discovery of vast oil and natural gas reserves, and the domination
of political life by the authoritarian government of Muammar Al Qadhafi,2 who
overthrew the Libyan monarchy on September 1, 1969.  The legacies of anti-Italian
insurgency and World War II combat, international pressures associated with the
Cold War, and complex relationships with Arab and African neighbors have all
shaped the country’s development.  See Appendix A for a discussion of Libya’s pre-
Qadhafi history, other background information, and a list of historical resources.
Figure 1. Map of Libya
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3 Over time, Qadhafi stopped using his military title and identifying himself with a formal
government position.  Although he retains de facto control over Libya’s affairs, he is now
commonly referred to as the “Guide of the Revolution” or “Brother Leader.”
The Qadhafi Era
 On September 1, 1969, a cabal of Libyan military officers led by army Captain
Muammar al Qadhafi seized important government institutions in the eastern city of
Benghazi and abolished the Libyan monarchy. Facing negligible internal resistance,
the leadership of the Movement, known as the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), established authority and announced that it would direct the activities of a
new cabinet.  The RCC also made statements affirming Libya’s Arab and Islamic
identity and its support for the Palestinian people. After renaming the country the
Libyan Arab Republic, the RCC announced the promotion of Captain Qadhafi to
Colonel and named him commander in chief of Libya’s armed forces.3  Like Qadhafi,
the other members of the RCC were pan-Arabist and socialist ideologues from rural
and somewhat marginalized communities. The United States did not oppose the 1969
coup, as the RCC initially presented an anti-Soviet and reformist platform.  
Colonel Qadhafi and the RCC focused intensely in their early years in power on
taking steps to safeguard “national independence” and consolidate their rule through
populist and nationalist political and economic programs. The members of the RCC
were determined to secure the immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S.
forces from military bases in Libya, which occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970,
respectively.  Italian expatriates were expelled and their assets were confiscated on
October 7, 1970.  All three dates subsequently were declared national holidays.  The
new government  also pressured U.S. and other foreign oil companies to renegotiate
oil production contracts and cede a larger share of production revenues.  Some
British and U.S. oil operations eventually were nationalized.  In the early 1970s, the
RCC gradually reversed its stance on its initially icy relationship with the Soviet
Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli
movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.  These policies
contributed to a rapid souring of U.S.-Libyan political relations, although economic
relations, particularly U.S. oil purchases from Libya, remained steady. 
The Green Book and Qadhafi’s Ideology.  Beginning in the early-1970s,
Muammar al Qadhafi and his regime carried out drastic and frequent reorganizations
of Libyan political and economic life in line with his “Third Universal Theory.” The
theory, which blends pan-Arab, Islamic, and socialist values, is enshrined in
Qadhafi’s three volume Green Book. The redistribution of land and wealth, the
allocation of fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political
institutions reshaped Libya’s social landscape in line with Qadhafi’s principles.
These trends also helped Qadhafi and his supporters maintain political control.
Overseas, Qadhafi promoted his political and economic “Third International Theory”
as an alternative to the capitalist and communist systems of the United States and the
Soviet Union for the developing countries of the Third World. Qadhafi’s
confrontation with the United States and was both a catalyst for and product of the
Libyan government’s violent and destabilizing activities abroad, Qadhafi’s
ideological fervor, and his regime’s gradual drift into the Soviet sphere of influence.
CRS-4
4 See Paul Richards, “War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2,1994-5,1995-6,”
Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 78, Issue 2, Spring 2005; Douglas Farah, Blood from
Stones, Broadway Books, New York, 2004, pp.23-25; The Economist, “Foday Sankoh,” Vol.
368, Aug., 9, 2003, p. 73; Economist, “Qaddafi Says Farewell, Arabia, and Sets His Sights
on Africa,” Vol. 351, Apr. 24, 1999; I. Abdullah and P. Muana, “The Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone,” in C. Clapham (ed.) African Guerrillas, London: James Currey,
1998, pp. 179-193; Scott Anderson, “The Makeover,” New York Times Magazine, Jan. 19,
2003; and Douglas Farah, “Gaddafi ‘Meddling’ in Africa,” Washington Post, Aug. 16, 2003.
5 Al-Hayah (London), Sept. 24, 2005. Open Source Center (OSC) Document
GMP20050924706004.
Terrorism and Confrontation with the United States.  In line with his
ideological precepts, Muammar al Qadhafi long characterized Libyan backing for
anti-colonial, separatist, and Islamist movements and terrorist groups around the
world as legitimate support for parties seeking self determination.  The United States
and others categorically and continuously rejected Libya’s policies as unacceptable
sponsorship of illegitimate terrorism and subversive violence. In the 1970s and
1980s, U.S. officials cited the existence of training camps in Libya and other Libyan
government support for a panoply of terrorist groups including the Abu Nidal
organization, the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Irish Republic Army.  Libyan-
sponsored bombings and assassinations also drew sharp international criticism,
especially killings of Libyan dissidents and the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and
UTA Flight 772 in the late 1980s.  In the 1990s, Libyan-trained individuals led brutal
rebel movements across Africa, including Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United
Front in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia.4
Qadhafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence.  The Arab-Israeli conflict was
another particularly pointed source of tension between the United States and
Qadhafi: Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with
Israel throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting armed struggle as the
only viable means to end Israel’s occupation of territory it captured from neighboring
Arab states in 1967.  At times, Qadhafi’s positions led to deep bilateral rifts between
Libya and Egypt, particularly under Anwar Sadat, as well as confrontations with
P.L.O. leader Yasir Arafat.   Qadhafi and his security services provided support,
training, and safe harbor for Palestinian terrorist groups until the late 1990s.  After
a temporary reconciliation with Arafat during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987,
Qadhafi returned to voicing complete opposition to the Oslo peace process and called
for Arab leaders to avoid further recognition of or negotiation with Israel.  
In recent years, Qadhafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab
engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli occupation and settlement
activity. He also has called for a “one state solution” based on reconciliation between
the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes be called
‘Isratine.’  In a 2005 interview, Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalqam
denied that Qadhafi planned to visit Israel in the wake of Israel’s unilateral
disengagement from the Gaza Strip, and argued that the disengagement had not
influenced Libya’s position toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.5  Qadhafi and
other Libyan officials met with Hamas figures Khaled Meshaal and PA Foreign
CRS-5
6 Reuters, “Libya Supports Palestinian Hamas - Report,” Mar. 24, 2006; Reuters, “Libya’s
Gaddafi Meets Palestinian Foreign Minister,” Apr. 30, 2006.
7 Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, Naval
Institute Press, 2003; Bernard Gwertzman, “Shultz Advocates U.S. Covert Programs to
Depose Qaddafi,” New York Times, Apr. 28, 1986; and Clifford Krauss, “Failed Anti-
Qaddafi Effort Leaves U.S. Picking Up the Pieces,” New York Times, Mar. 12, 1991.
Minister Mahmoud Zahar in March and April 2006 and, according to some reports,
pledged to provide financial support to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.6
International Isolation and Signs of Change.  Following the imposition
of U.N. sanctions in the aftermath of the Libyan-sponsored airliner bombings of the
late 1980s, Libya entered a period of increasing international isolation. The
compounded effects of a loss of oil revenue, restrictions on the travel of senior
officials, an international air travel ban, and an arms embargo brought significant
pressure on  Qadhafi and his government. Signs of change began to emerge in 1999
when Libya agreed to pay compensation for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and
allowed two intelligence agents to stand trial for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
Qadhafi’s offers of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and his late 2003 decision to dismantle
Libya’s weapons of mass destruction and long range missile development programs
marked further steps toward new relationships with the United States and the
international community. Qadhafi pledged to end his government’s support for
violent political movements around the world in December 2003, and the Libyan
government has recently participated in peacemaking efforts in a number of African
conflicts, including hosting and subsidizing U.N. World Food Program aid flights to
Darfur, Sudan from Libyan territory.  New oil production agreements and improved
relations with the United States and a number of European and Asian countries have
demonstrated the tangible benefits of Libya’s apparent new political orientation. 
Current Issues in U.S.-Libyan Relations
The restoration of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya
is expected to open a new chapter in the bilateral relationship and bring a long period
of U.S.-Libyan confrontation to a close.  The relationship between the United States
and Libya has been tense for much of the last thirty-five years but has normalized
gradually since late 2003.  The Libyan government’s past support for international
terrorism, its history of intervention in regional conflicts, and its now-abandoned
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction proved to be persistent points of contention
with the United States until recently. The Libyan government has long taken issue
with what it regards as unbalanced U.S. military and financial support for Israel and
what it describes as unwarranted U.S. intervention in the affairs of Arab states. In the
past, these differences led to a number of confrontations and engagements between
U.S. and Libyan armed forces, the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions
by the United States, and some limited, covert U.S. efforts at regime change.7  
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8 The C-130s remain in storage at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Georgia.  They reportedly
remain militarily useful, bur will require technology upgrades and significant repair. The
Administration reportedly has declined to release the planes, but may plan to allow their sale
and the return of the proceeds, minus repair and storage costs, to Libya. Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, “Bound to the Ground: Libyan C-130s Still Parked 30 Years After
Purchase,” May 2, 2004; and, Renae Merle, “After 30 Years, Libya Can’t Get Its Planes,
Might Get Repair Bill,” Washington Post, Aug. 18, 2006.
Current issues in U.S.-Libyan relations include resolution of the outstanding
claims from the families of U.S. victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks,
ongoing counterterrorism cooperation, Libya’s political and economic reform efforts,
and humans rights concerns.  A number of U.S. oil companies have successfully bid
for reentry into Libya’s energy market, and other U.S. businesses have resumed trade
relationships with Libyan firms.  The ongoing retrial of five Bulgarian nurses and one
Palestinian doctor accused of deliberately infecting over 400 Libyan children with
HIV has been welcomed by the United States, and U.S. officials have participated in
multilateral discussions concerning the establishment of a victims relief fund for the
HIV patients and their families.  
Reestablishing Normal Bilateral Relations 
The reestablishment of normal bilateral relations between the United States and
Libya has proceeded incrementally in the wake of Libya’s December 2003 decision
to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.  
! On February 11, 2004,  the United States opened a two-person
interest section at the Belgian embassy in Tripoli, which was
expanded to a larger Liaison Office in June 2004.  The White House
announced several measures on February 26, 2004, including
recisions on bans on using U.S. passports to travel to or through
Libya, and U.S. citizen expenditures in Libya.  
! On September 20, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order
13357 that ended most economic sanctions against Libya, allowed
air flights between the two countries, permitted Libyan purchases of
U.S.-built aircraft, and released approximately $1 billion in Libyan
assets that had been frozen in the United States.   
! On September 28, 2005, President Bush issued two waivers of Arms
Export Control Act restrictions on the export of defense articles to
Libya. The waivers allowed U.S. companies to “possibly participate”
in Libya’s efforts to destroy its chemical weapons and precursor
stockpiles, along with the refurbishment of eight C-130 transport
planes purchased by Libya in the 1970s that have been withheld for
the last thirty years.  The President has not indicated when or if the
aircraft will be delivered.8
! On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention
to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya’s
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9 Inside U.S. Trade, “BIS Removes Libya’s State Sponsor-related Export Controls,” Vol. 24,
No. 36, Sept. 8, 2006.
10 Sunday Times (London), “Focus: Was Justice Done?” Oct. 23, 2005; Magnus Linklater,
“It’s Time To Look Again at Lockerbie,” The Times (London), Oct. 26, 2005.
listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and a country not fully
cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  Full diplomatic
relations were restored on May 31, when the United States upgraded
its Liaison Office in Tripoli to Embassy status.
! On June 30, 2006, one day after the 45-day congressional
notification period for the rescission of Libya’s terrorism-related
designations ended, the remaining restrictions on U.S. trade with
Libya were removed, including the ban on the export of U.S. defense
articles. Certain dual-use technology exports remain restricted under
revised U.S. Commerce Department national security guidelines.9 
! On September 30, 2006, President Bush signed the Iran Freedom
Support Act (H.R. 6198/P.L. 109-293), which removed Libya from
the terms of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (P.L.107-24). 
Compensation for U.S. Victims of Libyan-Sponsored Attacks
Compensation and legal claims for some U.S. victims of Libyan government-
sponsored terrorist attacks remain unresolved.  Congress currently is considering
legislation that calls on the Administration to seek assurances from the Libyan
government that the claims will be adequately resolved prior to accepting Libyan
representatives’ diplomatic credentials or obligating FY2007 funds for diplomatic
relations with Libya (see “Current Congressional Issues,” below).  Libyan officials
and representatives of U.S. victims’ families have held new private talks regarding
the settlement of the families’ outstanding claims since May 2006.
Pan Am Flight 103.  On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am
flight 103 en route from London to New York, killing all 244 passengers and 15 crew
on board and another 11 people in the town of Lockerbie, Scotland.  On November
14, 1991, the United States and Scotland indicted two Libyan intelligence agents for
their alleged roles in the bombing: Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifah Fhimah. Under a U.N.-negotiated agreement, Fhimah and Al Megrahi were
tried on murder charges under Scottish law in The Hague beginning in 1999.  Fhimah
was acquitted and Al Megrahi was convicted:  he is currently serving a life sentence
in a Scottish prison.  Al Megrahi is appealing his conviction and the length of his 27-
year sentence before the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission.  Some
observers in the United Kingdom, including lead Scottish Lockerbie investigator
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, have questioned Al Megrahi’s conviction and argued that
the Lockerbie investigation should be reexamined.10  Claims have resurfaced that the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command may have planned
the bombing for Iran in retaliation for the downing of an Iranian airliner by the U.S.
CRS-8
11  Derek Lambie, “Diplomat ‘Evidence’ May Clear Megrahi of Flight 103 Bomb,” Express
on Sunday (UK), Sept. 24, 2006.
12 On April 21, 2004, Libya extended its unilaterally set deadline for the recision and
payment to the victims’ families to July 22, 2004.  Libya extended the deadline a second
time to Sept.ember 22, 2004.  Lawyers and U.S. negotiators secured a third extension to
April 30, 2005; however, Libya froze the final round of $2 million payments (worth an
estimated $500 million) and reasserted its demand for removal from the U.S. state sponsors
of terrorism list.  Associated Press, “Libyan Central Bank Takes Back Last Batch of
Compensation Money Due to Lockerbie Victims,” Apr. 9, 2005.
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Navy in 1988.11  In November 2006, the Scottish commission ruled that Al Megrahi’s
appeals could be heard in Scottish courts.  Hearings are expected in February and
March 2007.
In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 and agreed to a final settlement that calls for successive payments to the families
of victims following the termination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions.  As of October
2005, Libya had issued payments of $4 million per victim following the termination
of U.N. sanctions in September 2003 and a second payment of $4 million to each
victim following the termination of bilateral U.S. sanctions in September 2004.  The
Libyan government has withheld a final payment of $2 million until the United States
rescinds Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.12 A previously negotiated
final round of $2 million payments would be worth an estimated $500 million.
Libyan officials have not indicated publicly whether they will release the final
payment following the rescission of Libya’s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism. 
La Belle and Other Claims.  Compensation claims for U.S. victims of the
1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin and the 1989 Libyan-sponsored
bombing of a French passenger aircraft also are pending in U.S. courts.  Two U.S.
servicemen, Sgt. Kenneth T. Ford and Sgt. James E. Goins, were killed in the La
Belle bombing, and 80 other U.S. servicemen and women were injured.  Some were
permanently disabled.13  On September 19, 1989, a mid-air explosion killed 171
passengers and crew of the French airline UTA flight 772 over Niger in western
Africa, including seven U.S. citizens. On March 10, 1999, a French court found six
Libyans guilty in absentia for bombing the DC-10 aircraft.  Libya has made payments
to German and French victims for the bombings14 and has called for compensation
to be paid to Libyan victims of the 1986 retaliatory U.S. air strikes on Libya, which
killed civilians, including Muammar al Qadhafi’s adopted infant daughter.  
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Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Cooperation
Muammar al Qadhafi immediately condemned the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks as “horrific and gruesome” and his government has taken steps to improve
U.S.-Libyan counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing since 2001.  The
Libyan government has long perceived Al Qaeda as a threat because members of
Libya’s Islamist opposition have been linked to Al Qaeda and other foreign jihadist
organizations (see below).  This has contributed to Libya’s willingness to expand
counterterrorism cooperation with U.S. authorities. Qadhafi has characterized
members of Al Qaeda as “heretics” in prominent public statements and has described
his government’s intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation with the United
States as “irrevocable.”  U.S. officials reportedly hope to extend counterterrorism
assistance to Libya in the future under the framework of the interagency Trans-Sahara
Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which currently involves all of Libya’s
neighbors, except Sudan and Egypt.15 
Libya has taken direct action to limit the activities of known Al Qaeda
associates within its borders, including elements of its own Islamist opposition allied
with Al Qaeda.  In October 2004, Libya transferred the deputy commander of the
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak
al Para, to Algeria, where he was wanted on terrorism charges. Saifi had been in the
custody of the rebel Chadian Movement for Democracy and Justice, with whom
Qadhafi reportedly maintains a close relationship. Qadhafi has urged other Arab
governments to extend full counterterrorism cooperation to the United States.  Libya
is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism,
including the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism.
Trial of Bulgarian Nurses and International HIV Victims Fund
An ongoing legal case has powerful implications for revitalized commercial and
political relationships between Libya, the United States, and the member states of the
European Union.  In 1999, five Bulgarian female nurses and one Palestinian male
doctor were arrested on charges that they deliberately infected 426 Libyan children
with HIV as part of an HIV-AIDS treatment experiment.16 Approximately 50 of the
infected children have died. A French doctor testified at the trial that the children had
been infected in 1997, one year before the Bulgarians and the Palestinian arrived in
Libya. On May 6, 2004, a Libyan court found the Bulgarians and the Palestinian
guilty, and the six were sentenced to death by firing squad.  The decision also
sentenced one Bulgarian male doctor to four years for currency violations and
acquitted nine Libyan hospital officials of charges linked to the AIDS infections. 
In May 2005, a Libyan court acquitted nine Libyan policemen and a doctor
charged with torturing the five Bulgarians and a Palestinian to gain their confessions
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for allegedly infecting the children with HIV.  In August 2005, Libya’s ambassador
to the United Kingdom, Mohammed al Zaway, called on the Bulgarian government
to enter into negotiations with the families of the infected children over diya, a victim
payment and conflict resolution scheme outlined in Islamic law and commonly
referred to as “blood money.”  Bulgarian officials rejected the possibility of any
negotiation and maintained the nurses’ innocence. 
The Bulgarian government subsequently requested assistance from the United
States, the European Union, and the World Health Organization in securing the
nurses’ release.  Bulgaria is currently a candidate for EU membership, and EU
officials have supported Bulgaria’s claims in the case.  Members of Congress and
U.S. officials have raised the subject with their Libyan interlocutors since bilateral
contacts resumed in late 2003. During a joint press appearance in Washington with
Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov on October 17, 2005, President Bush stated
that, “there should be no confusion in the Libyan government’s mind, that those
nurses should be, not only spared their life, but out of prison, and we’ll continue to
make that message perfectly clear.”
On December 25, 2005, Libya’s Supreme Court overturned the convictions and
death sentences of the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor.  The court’s
actions followed the announcement of plans to create a relief fund sponsored by the
European Commission, the United Kingdom, Libya, Bulgaria, and the United States.
The International Benghazi Families Support Fund plans to provide relief for the
infected children and their families and to improve medical infrastructure in Libya.
Public protests in Libya following the announcements led to four arrests, and Libyan
authorities temporarily suspended further negotiations concerning the fund.  Libyan
families have subsequently requested compensation payments of 10 million
(approximately $12 million) per family to be administered by the international fund.
The medical professionals remain in Libyan custody.  Their retrial began in May
2006 but was characterized by numerous delays and rescheduled hearings.  In
September 2006, Libyan lawyers representing the children and their families called
for compensation of 15 million dinars ($11.6 million) per child “for moral and
material damages” — a total of $4.6 billion.17  In December 2006, the group’s death
sentence was reinstated, sparking new outcries from international observers and
complicating Libyan relations with the European Union and the United States, which
continue to advocate for their release.  In January 2007, Qadhafi reportedly suggested
that the nurses could be freed in exchange for the return of convicted Pan Am 103
bombing participant Al Megrahi to Libyan custody.18  Libyan officials warned of
further politicization of the case after the European Parliament and Council of the
European Union both formally expressed concern about the Libyan court’s verdict.
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The Return of U.S. Oil Companies  
Following the lifting of U.S. sanctions in 2004, Occidental Petroleum and the
so-called Oasis group, which consists of Amerada Hess, Marathon, and
ConocoPhillips, have engaged in negotiations with Libyan officials regarding the full
resumption of their production activities.  The issuance of Executive Order 12543 in
January 1986 forced the companies to abandon their Libyan operations.  During the
sanctions era, the companies’ holdings were managed by a subsidiary of the Libyan
National Oil Company (NOC) and all revenue from the sale of oil produced from the
concession areas accrued to the Libyan government.  The NOC made some attempts
to open the areas held in trust for the U.S. companies to foreign investment.  
A two-step process required the review of the existing production agreements
with the NOC and the ratification of new agreements by Libya’s political leadership.
Officials from the NOC and the Libyan government approved the terms of Occidental
Petroleum’s reentry as of July 1, 2005, paving the way for Occidental to resume
operations in its old concession areas.  The members of the Oasis group reached an
agreement with Libyan officials over the terms of their proposed re-entry in
December 2005.  Under the terms of the agreement, the Oasis group’s Waha
concessions in Libya’s Sirte basin will be extended for 25 years, and the NOC will
hold a 59% interest in the venture.  The group members agreed to make a one-time
$1.3 billion dollar reentry payment and to contribute $530 million toward the cost of
investments made by the Libyan NOC since 1986.  Libyan officials had expressed
their opinion that the reentry of the U.S. oil firms would support their government’s
efforts to secure Libya’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list.
Current Congressional Issues
Prior to the announcement of plans to restore full diplomatic relations with
Libya, some Members of Congress vocally supported further U.S. engagement in
response to Libya’s decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and long-
range missile development programs.19  Many Members have welcomed the
announced changes, although some Members have been vocal in calling for the
Administration to obtain assurances from the Libyan government that it will
adequately resolve the outstanding claims of some U.S. terrorism victims. Congress
did not act to reject the rescission of Libya’s terrorism-related listings or to reinstate
a ban on the sale of U.S. defense articles by passing a joint resolution during the 45-
day congressional notification period that lasted from May 15 to June 29, 2006.
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Legislative Efforts on Behalf of U.S. Terrorism Victims.  Congressional
concern over outstanding claims of U.S. terrorism victims has accompanied efforts
to restore full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya. In 2005,
Senator Levin offered an amendment (S.Amdt. 1497) during consideration of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) that would
have prohibited the use of any U.S. funds to support further “negotiations towards
normalizing relations” with Libya until the Administration certified to Congress that
the Libyan government had “made a good faith offer” to redress the compensation
claims of U.S. military personnel injured in the 1986 La Belle nightclub bombing and
the families of the two U.S. servicemen killed in the attack.20  The amendment was
eventually withdrawn.
Section 1225 of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1815, P.L.
109-163) required the Administration to submit a report “on the status of negotiations
between the Government of Libya and United States claimants in connection with the
bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque ... regarding resolution of their claims” and
“efforts by the Government of the United States to urge the Government of Libya to
make a good faith effort to resolve such claims.”  The report was submitted May 12,
2006:21 an annual update was due on the anniversary of the act’s original enactment
(January 6, 2007).
On June 7, 2006, the Senate passed S.Res. 504, which expressed the sense of
the Senate that the President should not accept the credentials of any Libyan
government representative without the expressed understanding that the Libyan
government will “continue to work in good faith to resolve outstanding cases of
United States victims of terrorism sponsored or supported by Libya, including the
settlement of cases arising from the Pan Am Flight 103 and LaBelle Discotheque
bombings.”  A similar House resolution (H.Res. 838) called for “the fulfilment of
Libyan financial commitments” to victims’ families and was referred to the
Committee on International Relations.
Embassy Relocation/Expansion and FY2007 Funds.  As of January 25,
2007, the Administration had not yet submitted a nominee for the U.S.
ambassadorship to Libya. In conjunction with the restoration of full diplomatic
relations, the United States has upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy,
which was scheduled to move to an interim location during late 2006.  Libyan
demonstrators attacked and burned the former U.S. Embassy in December 1979.
Plans to procure property for a new U.S. embassy are under review, and State
Department officials hope to move to a new compound by 2009.  No supplemental
FY2006 funding requests were submitted to support the upgrade.  Section 8 of H.R.
6060, the Department of State Authorities Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-472, signed January
11, 2007) amended the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986
(22 U.S.C. 4856) by striking subsection (c), which prohibited persons doing business
with Libya from receiving diplomatic construction contracts.  According to the
committee report on the act (H.Rept.109-706), the Administration sought “relief from
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this prohibition in order to undertake near-term activities, such as refurbishing and
maintaining the current Embassy location in Tripoli, as well as beginning the
preparations to build a new embassy compound.”
In the 109th Congress, Section 625 of the House version of the FY2007 Science,
State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 5672)
would have prohibited the use of appropriated funds “to carry out any diplomatic
operations in Libya” or accept the credentials of any Libyan government
representative until the President certifies that Libya “has taken irrevocable steps to
pay, in its entirety, the total amount of the settlement commitment of $10,000,000”
to the Pan Am Flight 103 families and that Libya “will continue to work in good
faith” to resolve other outstanding cases “including the settlement of the La Belle
Discotheque bombing.” The Section 625 prohibition was expected to complicate the
Administration’s announced plans to further normalize relations with Libya,
including efforts to expand the U.S. diplomatic and consular presence in Tripoli and
support U.S. businesses seeking to operate in Libya.  The Senate version of the bill
did not contain this provision (S.Rept.109-280).
Political and Economic Profile
Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile.  Muammar al Qadhafi was born in 1942
near the central coastal city of Sirte.  His Arabized Berber family belongs to the
relatively small Qadhafa tribe, and his upbringing was modest. As a young man
Qadhafi identified strongly with Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies espoused
by leaders such as Egypt’s Gamel Abdel Nasser.  Although he was excluded from the
elite Cyrenaica Defense Forces on a tribal basis during the Libyan monarchy period
(see Appendix A), Qadhafi was commissioned as a regular army captain following
stints at the Libyan military academy in Benghazi and the United Kingdom’s Royal
Military Academy at Sandhurst. Following his return to Libya, he led the September
1, 1969 overthrow of the Libyan monarchy with a group of fellow officers. He was
27 years old.  
Qadhafi has proven to be a controversial, complex, and contradictory political
survivor during his long reign in Libya, in spite of numerous internal and external
challenges to his rule.  He has exercised nearly complete, if, at times, indirect
political control over Libya over the last thirty-plus years by carefully balancing and
manipulating complex patronage networks, traditional tribal structures, and byzantine
layers of national, regional, and local governance. Libya’s foreign and domestic
policies nominally have been based on his personal ideology. In the past, Qadhafi and
his supporters have imposed his theories with realistic purpose and precision, not
hesitating to crush coup attempts, assassinate dissidents abroad, or sponsor violent
movements and terrorist attacks against Libya’s perceived external enemies.
Personally, Qadhafi often is described as mercurial, charismatic, shrewd, and
reclusive.  He is married and has eight children: seven sons and one daughter. An
April 1986 U.S. air strike in retaliation for a Libyan-sponsored anti-American
bombing in Berlin hit one of his homes in Tripoli, killing his adopted infant daughter
and hospitalizing members of his immediate family.  The incident continues to be a
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source of personal anger and resentment for Qadhafi: he has preserved the bombed
out ruins of the home in the military compound where it stood, and he remarked on
the death of President Ronald Reagan in 2004 that the former U.S. president had died
before he could be prosecuted for the “ugly crime that he committed in 1986 against
the Libyan children.”22
Political Dynamics
Libya’s often contradictory political dynamics are a product of competing
interest groups seeking to influence policy within the confines of the country’s
authoritarian political system and amid Libya’s emergence from international
isolation.  Elements of Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology permeate political discourse
on many security and foreign policy issues, while in other cases, such as economic
reform, new frameworks are being embraced to meet society’s current and changing
needs.  The legacies of colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence
continue to influence Libyan politics; rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty
and resistance to foreign domination are common in political statements.  Most
Libyans also accept a prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life: Islam is the
official religion and the Quran is the basis for the country’s law and its “social code.”
Tribal relationships remain important, particularly with regard to the distribution
of leadership roles in government ministries and in political-military relations. Tribal
loyalties remain strong within and between branches of the armed services, and
members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafa, hold many high ranking government
positions, including key positions in the air force.  Members of larger, rival tribes,
such as the Warfalla, have opposed the regime on grounds of tribal discrimination.
Some Libyan military and security officials staged limited, unsuccessful coup
attempts against Qadhafi in 1993 and 1996 based in part on tribal and familial
rivalries. The Qadhafi government has performed periodic reassignments and purges
of the officer corps to limit the likelihood of organized opposition reemerging from
within the military. However, these political considerations have affected the
military’s preparedness and war fighting capability.
Political parties and all opposition groups are banned in Libya under Law
number 71 of 1972. Formal political pluralism is frowned upon by many members
of the ruling elite, even as an increasing number of regime figures advocate for
greater popular participation in existing government institutions.  Opposition groups,
most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, appear to have shifted their political strategies
toward gradual attempts to influence national policy making in contrast to others’
confrontational efforts to change the makeup of the regime.  Prominent figures in
Libyan politics include Muammar al Qadhafi’s son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi,23
General People’s Committee Secretary Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi, National Oil
Company chief Shukri Ghanem, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalqam, and
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prominent members of the security establishment, including intelligence chief Musa
Kusa and army leader and original RCC member Abu Bakr Younis Jaber.
Government Structure
Libya has a unique political system composed of nominally decentralized and
participatory levels of government. Muammar al Qadhafi and his closest supporters
exercise final authority over domestic and foreign policies by means of their control
of the implementation mechanisms of the national government — the sizeable
military and security apparatus and a handful of powerful ministries. Qadhafi’s
ideological emphasis on “the authority of the people” is the stated basis for the
operation of Libya’s multiple levels of government. Although participation in these
institutions is mostly open and political leaders routinely encourage citizens to take
part in their deliberations, most external observers regard Libya’s political system as
largely authoritarian and undemocratic. The U.S. State Department’s annual human
rights reports document ongoing restrictions on political life and human rights in
Libya.
The “Authority of the People”.   A hierarchy of “people’s congresses”
make up Libya’s government and serve as venues for the exercise of “popular
authority” as defined by Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology. At the local level, citizens
meet in Basic People’s Congresses to appoint representatives to regional and
ultimately the national General People’s Congress.  Participation in the basic
congresses is open to all Libyan citizens, although participation rates are notoriously
low and Qadhafi regularly makes public statements expressing his disappointment
with participation levels and urging broader popular involvement in public affairs.
At the March 1, 2000, session of the General Peoples’ Congress, Qadhafi abolished
the positions of 12 General People’s Committee (cabinet-equivalent) secretaries and
reassigned their duties to provincial committees.  Secretariats of foreign affairs,
justice, public security, and finance remained under the authority of the centralized
General People’s Committee.  Some experts have argued that the decentralization
was designed to deflect popular criticism from the central government and further
dilute political opposition within the country.   
In March 2006, the Libyan government announced the replacement of Secretary
(prime minister-equivalent) of the General People’s Committee Shukri Ghanem by
former Health Minister Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi.  A cabinet reshuffle and the
creation of seven new ministries also were announced. The replacement of the
reform-oriented Ghanem has been interpreted by some observers as an effort by
conservative and hard-line elements of the Libyan political establishment to reassert
control over the speed and direction of Libya’s reform efforts.  Ghanem now serves
as the director of the National Oil Company, where he is involved with ongoing
international bidding for oil exploration and production-sharing agreements.   
Opposition Groups
The government has dealt harshly with opposition leaders and groups over the
last three decades, establishing special “people’s courts” and “revolutionary
committees” to enforce ideological and political discipline and to punish violators
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and dissidents. Abroad, Libyan intelligence personnel have monitored, harassed, and,
in some cases, assassinated expatriate dissidents, some of whom were referred to as
“stray dogs.”  Libya’s myriad opposition movements can be categorized broadly as
Islamist, royalist, or democratic in orientation. However, their activities and
effectiveness have been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry, and ideological
differences.  New efforts to coordinate opposition activities have begun in response
to Libya’s reintegration to the international community and the emergence of a
broader political reform debate in the Arab world.  However, most observers do not
regard any of Libya’s current opposition groups as a serious threat or alternative to
the current government. 
Exiles.  In the past, government officials and intelligence operatives have
monitored and taken violent action against expatriate opposition groups and leaders,
including in Europe and the United States.  Clandestine opposition groups also have
carried out assassinations and attacks against Libyan government officials abroad.
Opposition groups in exile include the National Alliance, the Libyan National
Movement (LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist Rally,
the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for
Democracy and Justice.  A royalist contingent based on the claim to the throne by
Mohammed al Sanusi, the grandson of the former king, is based in London.  These
groups and others held an opposition conference in July 2005 in London and issued
a “national accord,” calling for the removal of Qadhafi from power and the
establishment of a transitional government.24  
In a September 2005 interview, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalqam
characterized some of the regime’s expatriate opponents as individuals who fled the
country after committing economic crimes or collaborating with foreign intelligence
services.  He then invited any expatriate dissidents who had not committed crimes
to return to Libya.25  In August 2005, the government announced the return of 787
exiles who agreed to reconcile with the Qadhafi regime.26  Regional observers
characterized the return of prominent dissidents in August 2006 as evidence of an
ongoing, unofficial reconciliation program between the Libyan regime and its
expatriate opponents.27
The Muslim Brotherhood.  Like other political organizations and opposition
groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Libya under law number 71 of 1972.
Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood first
entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood has existed as a semi-official organization.  Hundreds of Brotherhood
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members and activists were jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually
reemerged and operated as a clandestine organization for much of the following two
decades.  In 1998, a second round of mass arrests took place, and 152 Brotherhood
leaders and members were arrested.  Several reportedly died in custody, and,
following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent Brotherhood leaders were
sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison.  The government
announced a retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and
in March 2006, the group’s 84 remaining imprisoned members were released.28  The
controller general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir,
describes the Brotherhood’s objectives as peaceful and policy-focused, and has called
for the cancellation of laws restricting political rights.29  Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has
reached out to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood by publicly characterizing the
organization as nonviolent and non-seditious. 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).  The Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG) is a violent Islamist movement opposed to the Qadhafi government
and allied with Al Qaeda and other international jihadist groups. According to the
Department of State, the LIFG has attempted to assassinate Qadhafi, most recently
in 1996, and may have participated in the planning of the May 2003 suicide
bombings in Casablanca, Morocco.30  The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets
under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001, and formally designated the LIFG
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004.  Some observers have
characterized the designation as a gesture of solidarity with Libya and have argued
that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may be
limited.  Others claim that LIFG fighters have allied themselves with other violent
Islamist groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cite evidence of Libyan
fighters joining the Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy
in Libya and a harbinger of a possible increase in violence associated with fighters
returning from Iraq.31  
In mid-2005, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi referred to plans to release some jailed
members of the LIFG and other violent Islamist groups from prison, following their
renunciation of violence and pledge to participate in society peacefully.32  In February
2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four
entities in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their
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role in supporting the LIFG.33  Press reports suggested that Libyan officials released
up to 60 members of the LIFG in January 2007 as part of ongoing negotiations for
the group’s disarmament.34
Political Reform and Human Rights
The authoritarian Libyan government’s poor human rights record has been
documented by world governments and international human rights monitors for much
of the last 35 years.  Annual reports on political and human rights conditions from
the U.S. State Department and international groups such as Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch have catalogued a broad range of recurring abuses
including arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, torture, a general ban on
political opposition, and official limitations on public speech, assembly, and press
activity.35  
Since 2003, Libyan political figures, including Muammar al Qadhafi and his son
Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, have made a series of public statements and policy
announcements in an effort to repair Libya’s reputation with regard to human rights
practices.  Some tangible steps have been taken, and Libyan authorities report that
legal reforms are under way that may improve the protections and rights afforded to
citizens.  Judicial entities associated with human rights abuses and political control
in the past, such as “revolutionary courts” and “people’s courts,” reportedly have
been dismantled.  As a result, some observers have expressed cautious optimism that
political, social, and religious freedom may be improving in Libya.  Others continue
to warn that such reforms may be merely cosmetic and meant to support the
government’s efforts to improve its domestic legitimacy and international standing.
Legal and Institutional Reform.  Libyan law prohibits the activities of all
political opposition groups and restricts the free exercise of speech and the press.36
Since Qadhafi’s 1969 coup, little legal recourse has been available to citizens accused
of political crimes.  Nevertheless, officials have announced plans to embark upon a
full review of the country’s Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to eliminate
restrictive laws regarding political activity.  New draft laws were scheduled to be
submitted to the General People’s Congress for consideration and approval during
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late 2005 or early 2006.37  Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi also has called for a constitution
to clarify the power of different legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in
Libya and has endorsed ongoing legal reforms as a means to “provide a free
environment that is suitable for a normal political life.”38
In support of these efforts, some institutional changes have been instituted to
improve political and human rights conditions. In March 2004, the General People’s
Committee Secretariat of Justice and Public Security was split into two separate
secretariats in an effort to establish greater judicial independence.  In January 2005,
the General People’s Congress approved a law abolishing judicial institutions known
as “people’s courts” and “revolutionary courts” that, until recently, tried suspected
regime opponents, sometimes in secret.  International human rights organizations
welcomed the abolition of the people’s court system as an “important step” and urged
Libyan authorities to grant new trials to prisoners convicted by the courts, including
several who were convicted in late 2004.
Human Rights Monitoring.  The Libyan government has not permitted the
establishment of independent human rights organizations but invited international
human rights groups Amnesty International and  Human Rights Watch to Libya for
the first time in 15 years.  In late 2004 and early 2005, representatives from both
organizations toured various security facilities and prisons and met with selected
imprisoned dissidents.  A January 2006 Human Rights Watch report based on
research conducted during the visit concluded that “Libyan leader Mu`ammar
al-Qadhafi and his inner circle appear unwilling to implement genuine reform,
especially in the areas of free expression and association,” although the Libyan
government has taken “some positive steps” to improve human rights conditions
since 2003.39 
Since 2004, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has publicly supported a pro-human rights
agenda and has created an official human rights monitoring body under the auspices
of the Qadhafi Development Foundation. The foundation’s Human Rights Society
now operates a national hotline for Libyans to report cases of unlawful detention,
seizure of property or assets, and death or injury at the hands of security personnel.40
Reports also suggest that the government intends to review all reported cases of
human rights abuses and property crimes and to compensate victims as part of a
national reconciliation program.  
Fathi al Jahmi.  Human Rights Watch reported in May 2006 that Fathi al
Jahmi, Libya’s most internationally recognized political prisoner, may be facing a
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death penalty sentence on charges of belonging to, supporting, or calling “for the
establishment of any grouping, organization or association proscribed by law.”41 Al
Jahmi was imprisoned in 2002 after publicly calling for elections and press reforms
and for criticizing Muammar al Qadhafi and the government.  President Bush praised
Al Jahmi’s subsequent release in March 2004 under a suspended sentence, but Al
Jahmi was soon rearrested after he repeated his calls for reform and expanded his
criticism of Qadhafi in interviews with regional satellite channels, including
U.S.-funded Al Hurra.  Al Jahmi has been detained since late March 2004 and may
be in ill health.  In an on-the-record briefing on May 15, 2006, Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch called the Al Jahmi case
“troubling” and indicated that U.S. officials continue to raise the issue with their
Libyan interlocutors.42  In November 2006, a State Department spokesman said, “We
continue to urge the Libyan government to release [Al Jahmi] and will continue to
do so.”43 
Energy and the Libyan Economy
Until the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya’s economic viability was seriously
questioned by many outside observers.  Foreign aid and subsidies largely supported
the national budget, until the introduction of massive amounts of oil revenue
transformed the country’s economy and social fabric. Following the September 1,
1969 military coup, Qadhafi and his government restructured Libya’s economy along
socialist lines, placing a heavy emphasis on national management of industry and
resource allocation.  However, the economy remained highly dependent on oil
revenue and thus highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices.44 The
government has announced its intention to reverse state ownership trends associated
with the country’s long experiment with socialism. Economic diversification and
resource management remain challenges for the government and private sector as
they seek to revive the economy and capitalize on interest from foreign investors. 
Oil revenue has been the lifeblood of the Libyan economy and government since
exports began in 1961, accounting for 95% of Libya’s annual foreign currency
earnings and 75% of annual government revenue in recent years.45  Since 1998, rising
oil prices have led to a tripling in Libyan oil revenue, reaching $18.1 billion in 2004
and projected to reach $19.4 billion in 2005.  The increase has spurred corresponding
growth in the economy.  Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi has stated that Libyans
are “very happy” with higher price levels in the global oil market, although he has
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underlined the importance of creating alternative sources of revenue and economic
growth in public statements.46
Economic Reform and Infrastructure Development. Pressure for
economic reform in Libya traditionally has coincided with periods of weaker oil
export revenue, although the emergence of a younger, technocratic leadership group
in recent years has sustained reform efforts during the current period of increasing oil
returns.  The centerpiece of Libya’s current economic reform efforts has been a
national economic strategy development project involving Libyan government
planning authorities, the Qadhafi Development Foundation, the U.S.-based Monitor
Group, and the London-based Cambridge Energy Associates.  To date, the project has
produced an assessment  report known as “the White Book,” which continues to be
evaluated for implementation by a steering committee led by Prime Minister Al
Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi. World Bank and International Monetary Fund initiatives
have also assessed Libya’s economic status and made recommendations for reform.
Other economic reform and infrastructure development initiatives include an
ongoing privatization program and has announced plans for billions of dollars worth
of railway hospitals, airport, school, and road construction projects. Plans also have
been announced for the creation of a free trade zone on the Mediterranean coast east
of Tripoli and a $6.5 billion social and economic development investment fund
designed to create greater income and economic equality among the Libyan
population.  In designing and implementing reform efforts, Libyan officials must
balance concerns about unemployment and social equity with longer term concerns
for diversification.  Some observers believe that high oil revenues will lessen
pressure for structural reform, in spite of the opportunity that surplus revenues may
create.
Oil Reserves and Production Capacity.  Libya’s proven oil reserves are
estimated at 39 billion barrels (ninth largest in the world).  Libyan officials estimate
that over 60% of the country has yet to be surveyed for oil and gas deposits, which
could hold an additional 76 billion barrels of oil.47  The Libyan National Oil
Company (NOC) manages oil production activity and negotiates exploration and
production agreements with foreign companies.  Oil exploration and production are
carried out on the basis of a 1955 oil law, and Libyan authorities reportedly are
drafting a new law to govern production activities and reform the foreign investment
approval process.  Foreign investment is regulated through exploration and
production agreements negotiated by foreign companies and the NOC.  In September
2006, Libya established a Council for Oil and Gas Affairs to regulate oil and gas
exploration and production and to approve decisions about the development of the
oil and gas sector.48  Most of Libya’s oil is exported to Italy, Germany, France, and
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Spain.  However, following the resumption of crude oil exports to the United States
in June 2004, oil shipments to U.S. refiners have increased, totaling 6.7 million
barrels by the end of 2004.49
Until recently, Libyan oil production had steadily declined from its peak of 3.3
million barrels per day (b/d) in 1970 due to the deterioration of production equipment
and infrastructure related to strict investment controls and international sanctions.
Libya currently produces 1.7 million barrels per day (b/d), which officials have stated
is currently the sector’s maximum capacity.  Since the termination of U.N. and U.S.
sanctions in 2003 and 2004, Libya has sought foreign investment to rehabilitate and
expand its oil production capacity and expects $11 billion in oil production related
investment from 2005 to 2015. Current government production targets are 3 million
b/d by 2010-2013 and 3.6 million b/d by 2019.50  The Libyan government has
indicated that it expects Libya’s production capacity to increase 18% by the end of
2006.51  A Development and Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) bidding
program is expected to take place during 2007 for foreign companies interested in
rehabilitating existing production facilities and areas.
New Exploration and Production-Sharing Agreements.  In addition to
negotiating the return of U.S. oil companies to their former production areas, Libyan
officials are presiding over a bidding process for new exploration and production-
sharing agreements. Known as “EPSA IV,” the fourth round of foreign agreement
bidding since the process began in 1979 is opening large areas of onshore and
offshore Libyan territory to new oil and gas exploration and production.  In January
2005, Libyan officials announced the results for the first fifteen EPSA-IV exploration
blocks, which cover an area of 51,000 square miles. Of the 63 international firms that
were approved by Libyan authorities and submitted bids, U.S. firms won exploration
licenses for 11 of the 15 blocks, whether as sole producers or as members of
consortia.  Occidental Petroleum, which has secured a return to its former
concessions, led the U.S. companies with nine successful bids, and Amerada Hess
and Chevron Texaco also secured new licenses. Representatives from Occidental
Petroleum have stated that the company expects to drill a handful of exploration
wells in its new license areas in 2006. 
Winners of the second batch of EPSA IV bids were announced on October 2,
2005.  European and Asian firms received most of the licenses, and Exxon-Mobil
was the sole U.S. license recipient. A third bidding round has been held for 12
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offshore and 29 onshore blocks, with results expected in December 2006.  Some oil
and gas market analysts have speculated that the approval of the majority of
production licenses for U.S. companies in the first EPSA-IV round may have been
intended as an economic reward to the United States for agreeing to lift its bilateral
sanctions against Libya.  Others have argued that U.S. firms were successful because
of their willingness to agree to production share terms that heavily favored the Libyan
government and agreed to pay large signing bonuses.  European and Asian oil
companies have expressed strong interest in participating in new Libyan ventures and
are expected to submit competitive bids in the upcoming rounds.
Natural Gas.  Libya’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated to be 52
trillion cubic feet, although, like the country’s oil reserves, Libya’s gas holdings may
be significantly higher given the generally under-explored status of Libyan territory.
As with oil production, the development of natural gas production and export
capacity has been limited by restrictive investment policies and international
sanctions.  Nevertheless, Libya has been able to use natural gas for some domestic
power generation and for limited exports to some European countries.  Shell has
reached an agreement with Libyan authorities to explore for natural gas deposits and
to upgrade Libya’s aging liquefied natural gas plant at Marsa al Brega.52  Libyan
authorities also are reportedly pursuing pipeline agreements with neighboring North
African states to improve export access to European markets.  Representatives from
British Petroleum (BP) also are discussing natural gas projects with Libyan officials.
Military Profile and WMD Disarmament
The Libyan Military
Structure, Training, and Equipment.  Libya’s mostly conscripted military
forces are small relative to the large amount of weaponry at their disposal (see Table
1 below). Most outside military analysts regard the training and leadership of Libyan
forces as poor and identify a lack of combined arms and joint service planning as
factors that limit their overall effectiveness.  The Qadhafi government historically has
made the acquisition of weapons and equipment a higher priority than training or
creating high-quality military support infrastructure. 
Libya’s army, navy, and air forces are equipped with a broad range of aging
Soviet and Eastern Bloc equipment, although the country’s poorly maintained
inventories also include some U.S. and western European arms, including French
Mirage fighters and U.S. C-130 transports.53  Libya’s exorbitant military spending in
the late 1970s and early 1980s yielded an unmanageable crop of diverse weapon
systems from various sources and manufacturers. Purchases declined significantly
CRS-24
54 Senior Middle East security analyst Anthony Cordesman has described Libya as “the
world’s largest military parking lot.”  For a more detailed profile of the Libyan military, see
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Mar. 15, 2004, pp. 79-85.
55 AFP, “French Defence Minister Holds Talks in Libya,” Feb. 5, 2005; Andrew Borowiec,
“Paris Strengthens Military Ties with Libya,” Washington Times, Feb. 17, 2005; and, Flight
International, “France Eyes Libyan Deal,” August 1, 2006.
56  Antony Barnett, “MoD targets Libya and Iraq as ‘Priority’ Arms Sales Targets,” Observer
(London), Sept. 24, 2006.
during the 1990s because of international sanctions, which limited the revenue
available for defense spending. Libya’s current military leadership presides over a
largely stored and surplus catalogue of weaponry with poor maintenance records.54
The military also lacks sufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate the military
equipment currently in its possession. 





Revolutionary Guard Corps 3,000
Reserve Militia 40,000
Total 119,000
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2004-2005;  Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle
East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004; and Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies, “Libya,” Middle East Military Balance, Apr. 10, 2005.
Arms Sales.  The subject of renewed arms sales to Libya remains a sensitive
subject in the United States and some European countries whose citizens were killed
in Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks during the 1980s.  The European Union lifted
its arms embargo against Libya in October 2004.  The U.S. ban on export of defense
articles lapsed at the end of a 45-day congressional notification period, on June 30,
2006. Qadhafi reportedly has expressed interest in procuring U.S., European, and
Russian weapon systems.  France, Spain, Ukraine, and Russia are among the
countries reportedly interested in refurbishing and replacing Libya’s weapon stocks.55
The United Kingdom’s Defense Export Services Organization (DESO) reportedly has
labeled Libya a “priority” market in documents promoting exports by U.K. arms
manufacturers.56
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WMD Programs and Disarmament57
Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Programs.  Despite Libya’s
membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Libyan leader Muammar
al Qadhafi made several efforts to acquire nuclear weapons related technology
assistance, beginning in the early 1970s.  The most renowned was his reported
unsuccessful request for a working nuclear weapon from China in the 1970s.  Other
unsuccessful attempts to acquire nuclear energy technology useful to the
development of nuclear weapons were subsequently made through contacts with the
Soviet Union, the United States, France, India, Pakistan, Japan, and Argentina.58
Nonetheless, most experts agree that Libya never had a dedicated indigenous nuclear
weapons program. Over the next 25 years, Qadhafi made several public statements
in which he argued that Arab states were compelled to develop their own nuclear
weapons capability in response to Israel’s development of nuclear weapons.59 Libya
established a small nuclear research reactor at Tajura in 1979 with Soviet assistance,
and entered into several rounds of negotiations with Soviet and French authorities for
the  construction of large nuclear power facilities that were never concluded. 
According to several press accounts, Libyan officials reached an agreement with
Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1997 for Khan and his illicit
proliferation network to provide the Libyan government with a nuclear weapons
design and the uranium enrichment technology it desired.  These accounts and
International Atomic Energy Agency reports describe how, over the next six years,
a complex network of companies and individuals in Malaysia, Switzerland, Pakistan,
Spain, Turkey, South Africa, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab
Emirates supplied Libya with uranium enrichment components.60 
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Libya’s chemical weapons programs were more advanced and independent than
its nuclear weapons development activities. In 1986 and 1987, U.S. officials
suspected Libya of using Iranian-supplied chemical weapons against military forces
in neighboring Chad and provided the Chadian military with protective equipment
to guard against further Libyan attacks.61  During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
Libyan government developed chemical weapons production facilities at Rabta,
Sebha, and Tarhuna with technology acquired from a number of western European
and Asian firms.62  The plants produced large amounts of chemical weapons and
components, including 23 tons of mustard gas.  Libya’s ballistic missile program
relied on foreign technical assistance to produce Scud-B and a limited number of
Scud-C missiles but was limited by a lack of indigenous technical skill and
ineffective management.63  
Termination of WMD and Missile Programs.  In 1999, Libyan officials
approached the Clinton Administration and offered to dismantle Libya’s chemical
weapons programs in exchange for a loosening of U.S. terrorism sanctions.  The offer
was rejected in an effort to maintain pressure on Libya to comply with U.S. and
United Nations demands in the Lockerbie airliner bombing case.  Following the
Lockerbie settlement, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and intelligence chief Musa Kusa re-
engaged with U.S. and British intelligence authorities beginning in March 2003
regarding Libya’s weapons of mass destruction programs.  The October 2003 naval
interception of the freighter BBC China, which was carrying centrifuge components
to Libya, accelerated negotiations and led to assessment visits by U.S. and British
personnel later that month and in early December 2003.  
On December 19, 2003, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalqam read a
statement on Libyan national television announcing the government’s decision to
dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs and to
invite international inspectors to Libya to remove materials and perform verifications.
Qadhafi publicly  endorsed the statement, paving the way for the removal of WMD-
related equipment from Libya in January and March 2004.64  Subsequent reviews of
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seized material and interviews with Libyan officials indicated that Libya remained
far from developing a nuclear weapons capability, although A.Q. Khan sold Libya
a crude nuclear weapons design and some components necessary to begin a uranium
enrichment program. However, as of late 2003, Libya had not obtained key pieces of
equipment, such as a sufficient number of high precision rotors to power its
enrichment centrifuges.65 
Motives for Disarmament.  Officials and independent observers have
attributed Libya’s decision to end its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction to a
number of factors.  Administration officials have argued that U.S. military action in
Iraq in 2003 demonstrated to Libya the resolve of the Bush Administration to
eliminate perceived threats to U.S. security posed by states associated with terrorism
and in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.  In contrast, Libyan officials have
denied that external pressure or threats influenced their government’s decision
making processes and have characterized the decision as a sovereign initiative to
restore Libya’s ties with the international community and improve its security and
economy.  Most independent observers have argued that Libya’s decision was a
calculated move designed to extricate the country from the international sanctions
regime that was limiting its economic activity and contributing to the deterioration
of its vital oil and natural gas infrastructure.  Libyan officials have pointed to the
financial and economic rewards associated with its international re-engagement,
although, prior to the restoration of full diplomatic relations, Qadhafi stated his belief
that Libya should be more directly and substantively rewarded by the United States
for its decision to disarm.
International Controls and Inspections.  Libya acceded to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975.  Libya’s nuclear research facility at Tajura
has been subject to IAEA safeguards since 1980.   Since Libya announced its intent
to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) have monitored and assisted in ongoing disarmament activities.
Libya signed an “additional protocol” agreement in March 2004 granting IAEA
inspectors greater access to its nuclear facilities.  The IAEA continues to evaluate
Libyan disclosure statements related to the scope of its uranium enrichment and
nuclear weapons development activities, particularly with regard to the sources of the
materials Libya acquired from the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist Abdul
Qadeer Khan.  As a result of the 2003 WMD disarmament decision, Libya signed the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and acceded to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2004.  Libya also committed to eliminating all its
ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500 kilograms and
agreed to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.  Libya,
the U.S., and the UK established a Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee
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(TSCC) to oversee the elimination of Libyan WMD and MTCR-related missile
programs in September 2004. 
As of October 2005, all materials and components associated with Libya’s
nuclear weapons development program had been removed and all associated
activities had stopped.   Libya returned highly enriched nuclear fuel assemblies
weighing 17 kilograms from its Tajura research reactor to Russia in 2004, and Russia
replaced them with low enriched uranium fuel in December 2005 as part of a
program co-sponsored with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S.
Department of Energy.66  During the summer of 2006, Libya returned a further 3
kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Tajura reactor to Russia.67  
Libya has submitted an inventory of its chemical weapons and related activities
to the OPCW and has destroyed over 3,600 munitions designed to disperse chemical
agents.  The OPCW has verified Libya’s inventory of 23 metric tons of mustard gas
and over 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals and approved the conversion of
a chemical weapons facility into a pharmaceutical plant for the production of
HIV/AIDS and malaria medication. The Department of State began retraining
assistance programs for Libyan scientists in 2004, and President Bush waived
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act in order to allow U.S. firms to “possibly
participate” in the destruction of Libya’s remaining chemical munitions and
precursors, which, under the CWC, is required before April 29, 2007.68  Libya has
applied for an extension of this deadline, and U.S. State Department officials
estimate that a further $20 million may be necessary.69
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Appendix A: Libya’s Pre-Qadhafi History
Libya’s Colonial Experience
The Ottoman Empire and Qaramanli Dynasty.  Ottoman forces first
occupied the coastal regions of the territory that now constitutes Libya in the mid-16th
century. However, Ottoman administrators faced stiff and near constant resistance
from tribal confederations and a rival independent state in the Fezzan region, all of
which limited the Ottomans’ political influence.  Beginning in 1711, a semi-
independent state under Turkish official Ahmed Qaramanli emerged in Tripoli and
established control over the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with
Fezzan remaining contested.  The Qaramanli family maintained its power and
independent rule until the early 19th century through naval privateers and pirates
under its control who were used to collect tribute and ransom from merchant vessels
seized in the Mediterranean Sea.
“The Shores of Tripoli”.  The Qaramanli naval forces of Tripoli formed one
component of a regional grouping commonly referred to as “the Barbary pirates,”
which played a pivotal role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the young
United States.  Beginning in the late 1780s, a series of confrontations between U.S.
merchant ships and naval raiding parties from Tripoli and other neighboring city-
states such as Algiers and Tunis led to the destruction of U.S. maritime cargo and the
seizure of U.S. hostages.  Subsequent negotiations between the United States and the
governments of the Barbary states concluded with the signing of some of the first
bilateral treaties in U.S. history, including U.S. agreements to pay tribute to Tripoli
in exchange for the safe passage of U.S. vessels off what is now the Libyan coast. 
Disputes over the terms of this bilateral agreement and continuing attacks on
U.S. merchant ships impressed upon the U.S. government the need for a naval
protection force to safeguard U.S. commercial activity in the Mediterranean. This
need eventually was satisfied by the creation of the United States Navy by Congress
in April 1798.  An attack on the U.S. consulate in Tripoli in 1801 and further attacks
on U.S. ships sparked open hostilities between the newly commissioned light naval
forces of the United States and the privateers of Tripoli. Frequent naval engagements
from 1801 to 1805 were often won by U.S. forces, but one skirmish in 1804 ended
with the grounding of the U.S.S. Philadelphia and the capture of her crew.  The
conflict culminated in the overland seizure of the eastern Libyan city of Darnah by
U.S. Marines and a team of recruited indigenous forces in 1805 - the basis for the
reference to “the shores of Tripoli” in the Marine Corps hymn.  The fall of Darnah
compelled the Qaramanli leadership in Tripoli to relent to demands to ransom the
U.S. prisoners and sign a “treaty of peace and friendship.” Efforts to repatriate the
remains of U.S. personnel killed in these early 19th century military engagements with
Tripoli are ongoing.70
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The decline of Qaramanli naval power following the confrontation with the
United States contributed to the dynasty’s steady loss of political power. Ottoman
authorities reoccupied Tripoli in 1835 and began a campaign to pacify and coopt the
region’s tribal confederations.  The Ottomans solicited the cooperation of the leaders
of a conservative revivalist Sufi order known as the Sanusiyah based in Cyrenaica,
which they allowed to raise an independent militia and participate in a tacit ruling
partnership. Although the Ottoman administrative structure imposed in the 19th
century formed the basis for a centralized state, the penetration of Ottoman political
power remained incomplete and regional resistance to Ottoman reforms and central
authority persisted into the 20th century.
Italian Annexation and Post War Uncertainty.  Italy annexed Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica in 1911, and the Ottoman Empire’s subsequent release of its claim to
its territory in 1912, marked the beginning of a violent twenty-year period of
resistance to Italian rule led by the Sanussi order and local tribes.  The Italian
occupation authorities dismantled the remaining Ottoman governing structures and
disrupted the activities of social and cultural institutions across Libya. Sanussi
resistance fighters were defeated during World War I, and the international
community formally recognized Italian control over the territory in 1924.  A second
round of anti-Italian insurgency spurred a violent crackdown by Italian forces under
Mussolini, who renamed the territory Libya in 1929.  Resistance based in Cyrenaica
was worn down and ultimately crushed by 1931.  In 1934, Italian peasant colonists
began entering the provinces, leading to the displacement of local farmers and the
uprooting of established agricultural communities across the country. The population
of Cyrenaica remained hostile to Italian rule and its Sanussi leaders allied themselves
with British colonial forces in neighboring Egypt.
During the Second World War, Libya served as a staging ground for Italian and
German attacks on French North Africa and British-held Egypt.  Pivotal battles took
place in Cyrenaica from 1940 to early 1943, when German and Italian forces were
forced from Libya by British troops under General Bernard Montgomery.  British-
organized Sanussi fighters played a role in supporting allied operations against
German and Italian forces.  Following the war, Libya’s provinces were divided under
British and French protection until the disposition of Italy’s former colonies could
be negotiated.  Protracted and complex negotiations continued for years.  In
November 1949, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 289 declared that the three
disparate regions would be united in a single, independent state. The resolution also
dispatched a United Nations Commissioner to assist a national assembly representing
the regions in creating institutions for a new state that was to assume sovereignty no
later than January 1, 1952.  The strength of tribal and regional identities complicated
the subsequent negotiations and strongly influenced the new government following
independence.
Independence and Monarchy, 1951-1969
A constitution agreed to by the U.N.-assisted National Constituent Assembly in
October 1951 established a federal system of government with central authority
vested in King Idris As Sanussi I and legislative authority vested in a Prime Minister,
a Council of Ministers, and a bicameral legislature.  On December 24, 1951, the
United Kingdom of Libya became one of the first independent states in Africa.  The
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first parliamentary election was held in February 1952, one month after
independence.  Political parties were banned by the king shortly after independence
was declared, and Libya’s first decade of independence was characterized by
continuous bargaining and rivalry among the provincial governments over taxation,
development, and constitutional issues.  In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal
system of government with a unitary monarchy that centralized royal authority, in
part to streamline the development of the country’s newly discovered oil resources.
Prior to the discovery of marketable oil in 1959, the Libyan government was
largely dependent on economic aid and technical assistance it received from
international institutions and through military basing agreements with the United
States and United Kingdom.  The U.S.-operated air base at Wheelus field outside of
Tripoli served as an important Strategic Air Command base and center for military
intelligence operations throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Oil wealth brought rapid
economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya in the 1960s, but the
weakness of national institutions and Libyan elites’ growing identification with the
pan-Arab socialist ideology of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to
the gradual marginalization of the monarchy under King Idris.  Popular criticism of
U.S. and British basing agreements grew, becoming amplified in wake of Israel’s
defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War.  King Idris left the country in mid-
1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a military coup in September, led by
a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qadhafi.
